

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CANBER 01287 200103Z

71

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
----- 034135

O P 200010Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7538

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 1287

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR SILBERMAN TO ASST SECRETARY LEWIS
PASS SEC LABOR AND UNDER SECRETARY COMMERCE

1. EXTENSIVE MEETINGS FEBRUARY 16, 17 INCLUDED SESSIONS
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA, LABOR MINISTER HASEGAWA AND
TOP STAFF OF LABOR MINISTRY, WORKING LUNCH WITH DEPUTY
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YOSHINO AND STAFF AND THREE HOUR
EXCHANGE WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL OF UN BUREAU OKAWA AND STAFF.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA TOLD AMBASSADOR HODGSON IN
CORRIDOR CONVERSATION PRIOR TO OUR MEETING THAT HE HAD STUDIED
SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VIEWS ON THE ILO AS EXPRESSED IN HIS
LETTER TO ILO/DG BLANCHARD AND HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THE SUBJECT
BY HIS MINISTRY PEOPLE. FOREIGN MINISTER ADVISED HODGSON
(1) THAT HE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY'S POSITION WAS WELL TAKEN
AND (2) THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY FIND HIS OWN VIEWS ON THIS
SUBJECT MORE SUPPORTIVE THAN THOSE OF SOME OF THE MEMBERS
OF HIS RPT HIS MINISTRY. IN RESPONSE TO MY PRESENTATION
MIYAZAWA NOTED THAT POSITION SEEMED TO HIM TO BE TOUGHER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CANBER 01287 200103Z

IN TONE THAN THE LETTER. I RESPONDED THAT THE POSITION THAT

I EXPRESSED COINCIDED IN SUBSTANCE WITH THE LETTER BUT IF THE LETTER WAS INTERPRETED TO REFLECT A US UNWILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW FROM ILO EVEN IF NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES, IT WAS MISINTERPRETED. CLEAR FROM MIYAZAWA'S INTIAL COMMENTS THAT HE AND OTHERS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSUMED LETTER DESIGNED TO ADMINISTER "GOOD SHOCK TREATMENT" FOR ILO BUT THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO WITHDRAW. I MADE CLEAR OUR POLICY SEEKS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE AND THAT WITHOUT SUCH CHANGE WE WOULD PREFER TO WITHDRAW RATHER THAN REMAIN IN ILO.

3. MIYAZAWA NOTED THAT IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US, TRADE UNIONS MAY WISH TO CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN ILO AND THERERFORE OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE LESS FLEXIBILITY THAN US. I TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT ASKING JAPAN TO GET OUT OF ILO AND MIYAZAWA EXPRESSED HOPE THAT US WOULD SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY ON OUR AGENDA.

4. MIYAZAWA AND OTHERS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY REPEATEDLY ASKED IF VERY PRESENCE OF COMMUNIST NATIONS IN ILO DID NOT DE FACTO COMPROMISE TRIPARTITE PRINCIPLE. THEY OBSERVED THAT US POSITION IF TAKEN TO EXTREME WOULD RESULT IN EXPULSION OF COMMUNIST NATIONS. I RESPONDED BY CONCEDED THAT COMMUNIST NATIONS PARTICIPATION DID CREATE ANOMALY; BUT THEIR ADMISSION WAS AUTOMATIC UNDER CONSTITUTION AND US PRUPOSE WAS NOT TO FORCE THEIR WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, US UNALTERABLY OPPOSED WEAKENING OF TRIPARTITE PRINCIPLES IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE NATIONS OPPOSED TO TRIPARTITISM. OUR POLICY TO LIMIT ANOMALY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND FOR THAT REASON WE OPPOSE ELECTION OF COMMUNISTS TO MAJOR POSTS.

5. MIYAZAWA EN PASSANT INDICATED THAT US WITHDRAWAL FROM ILO WOULD NOT UPSET THE WHOLE UN SYSTEM BUTCOULD HAVE SALUTARY EFFECT. I RESPONDED BY EMPHASIZING THAT A WORKING ALLIANCE ON THE PART OF THE DEMOCRACIES IN THE ILO WOULD BE PREFERABLE AND COULDHAVE POSITIVE IMPACT ON OTHER UN FORA.

6. IN OTHER MEETINGSWITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS I DENIED THAT US PREPAREDNESS TO WITHDRAW FROM ILO REPRESENTED RETURN TO EITHER "FORTRESS AMERICA" OR DULLES CRUSADE. JAPANESE PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY FACT THAT CERTAIN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CANBER 01287 200103Z

POINTS IN LETTER OF INTENTION TO WITHDRAW APPLY EQUALLY TO UN ITSELF. I RESPONDED THAT TRIPARTITE CONCEPT IN ILO UNIQUE AND THEREFORE USG LOOKED AT ILO QUESTION IN SOME RESPECTS DIFFERENTLY THAN UN. I CONCEDED, HOWEVER, USG RECOGNIZES WITHDRAWAL FROM ILO COULDN'T HELP BUT HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS.

7. OKAWA INDICATED GOJ WOULD SUPPORT US ON OPPOSITION TO

STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND EFFORTS TO REDRESS DOUBLE STANDARD AND VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS. HE ADMITTED OUR POSITION ON ELECTIONS PRESENTED DIFFICULTY FOR HIM BECAUSE CONTRARY TO UN PRACTICE BUT WHEN I ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD SUPPORT LABOR MINISTER OF CHILE FOR PRESIDENT OF ILO CONFERENCE HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANCE TO OUR IDEA OF OPPOSING THE ELECTION OF COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVE.

8. LABOR MINISTER HASEGAWA EXPRESSED SYMPATHY WITH US POSITION AS WELL AS PERSONAL ANNOYANCE WITH ILO DRIFT. HE PARTICULARLY TROUBLED BY INQUIRIES INITIATED BY JAPANESE UNIONS INTO CERTAIN JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PRACTICES WITH PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES. HOWEVER, HE ALSO NOTED THAT JAPANESE UNIONS VALUED ILO MEMBERSHIP.

9. HASEGAWA URGED THE US TO REMAIN IN ILO AND FIGHT USING METAPHOR THAT IF US NOT IN THE RING, WE COULD NOT CONTINUE FIGHT AND JAPAN COULD NOT FIGHT WITH US. I RESPONDED WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO STAY IN THE RING AND FIGHT WITH JAPAN AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES BUT WE WERE DAMNED IF WE WOULD FIGHT IN THE RING ALONE.

10. COMMENT: AS INDICATED BY UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER AND LENGTH OF CONSULTATIONS, JAPANESE TREAT ISSUE VERY SERIOUSLY INDEED AS WELL APPRECIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH US. PRIOR TO OUR TALKS THEY CLEARLY BELIEVED PHRASE IN SECRETARY KISSINGER'S LETTER "WE DO NOT EXPECT TO WITHDRAW", MEANT USG NOT REALLY PREPARED TO WITHDRAW BUT THAT IS NO LONGER THEIR VIEW.

11. GOJ UNDOUBTEDLY WILLING TO DO A GREAT DEAL TO HELP RECTIFY PROBLEMS IN ILO BOTH BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE AND BECAUSE THEY ARE APPREHENSIVE AS TO LONG TERM
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 CANBER 01287 200103Z

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF US WITHDRAWAL. HOW FAR THEIR PARTICIPATION WILL GO, PARTICULARLY WHEN IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH COMMUNIST AND NON ALIGNED NATIONS, WILL DEPEND ON THEIR APPRAISAL AS TO HOW SERIOUS WE REMAIN AND ON CONTINUED CLOSE CONSULTATION.
HARGROVE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: WITHDRAWAL OF MEMBERSHIP, POLICIES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR UNIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976CANBER01287
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760063-0233
From: CANBERRA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760231/aaaabavk.tel
Line Count: 160
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13 APR 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <14 APR 2004 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ILO CONVERSATIONS IN TOKYO
TAGS: ELAB, PORG, AS, US, JA, ILO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006